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Abstract. Traditional gravity fed irrigation systems in Hispano communities in New Mexico, USA, are 
referred to as acequias. Water scarcity is currently motivating negotiations between acequias and 
municipalities over sharing agreements. Research on willingness to pay to protect and maintain acequias 
is still scarce. These valuation data could be helpful to improve the quality of water resources decision 
making and therefore rural development strategies in this region, which is relatively poor compared to 
the US average. Data from an open-ended CVM survey are used to examine WTP for a program 
designed to strengthen and perpetuate irrigation and culture on the acequias of El Río de las Gallinas, in 
rural northeastern New Mexico. Results indicate that the community supports the program in general, 
with higher levels of support among rural residents and Anglos. 
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1 Introduction 
The history of the US West is partly a history of water conflict (Wilkinson, 1992; Reisner, 
1986; Phillips et al., 2011).With increases in population and economic growth4, that con-
flict seems bound to intensify. In northern New Mexico traditional irrigation ditches 
known as acequias are in the middle of this conflict. 
Traditional, common-property irrigation ditches are often called acequias de común in New 
Mexico (Rodriguez, 2006; Rivera, 1998, 2006). This term is usually shortened to acequias. 
Centuries-old, acequias descend from a shared Roman, Islamic, Spanish, and Native Ameri-
can heritage. The name derives from the Arabic “as-sakiya,” or “the water-bearer (Peña, 
2003).” Spanish settlers inherited Roman and Moorish irrigation systems in southern Spain 
(Simmons, 1972; Phillips et al., 2011), which technology and law they brought to the New 
World. These systems dovetailed with and changed through contact with indigenous irriga-
tion systems in the upper Rio Grande valley, or Rio Arriba (Rivera, 2006; Simmons, 1972). 
The term acequia itself carries a sort of weight in New Mexico, as not all irrigation ditches are 
thus called. In certain regions, for instance the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, some 
irrigation ditches are simply called ditches, while others have the status of acequia. Typically the 
term acequia applies to a community ditch, where there is some extent of communally owned 
and maintained conveyance or ditchbank easement for access to the ditch. Additionally, the 
traditional Spanish term for someone who irrigates from an acequia is parciante, which is not 
immediately interchangeable with the term irrigator. A parciante is really a term to designate a 
position within a community; one who partakes in the benefits of irrigation but also contrib-
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utes to its upkeep, and the term has come to signify a specific relationship to common pool re-
source management within at least a somewhat traditional management context (Rodriguez 
2006; Rivera, 1998). Additionally, it is used almost entirely in traditionally Hispano communities. 
Indigenous irrigators would not necessarily call themselves parciantes, surely as the term hardly 
exists outside New Mexico in the US, with the exception of parts of southern Colorado. Some 
will interchangeably use the terms irrigators or parciantes, just as sometimes people will alter-
nately use acequia or ditch. With a few exceptions, this paper refers to acequias and parciantes 
throughout. This is in part to distinguish them from other, non-communal or commercial irri-
gation operations, and also to use their own terminology for themselves. It is common for 
both Hispano and non-Hispano irrigators on an acequia to call themselves parciantes. As with 
any traditional, culturally embedded natural resource management system, some of the termi-
nology is highly local, and its use provides a more accurate picture of the system than would 
more generic terms. 
Acequias have supplied water to crops and villages in a high altitude region with scarce and 
variable water supplies (Thomson, 2012; Gutzler, 2012) for centuries (Hutchins, 1928; Ro-
driguez, 2006). With changes in water law (Hall, 2012; Philips et al., 2011; Rivera, 1998; 
Rodriguez, 2006; NMAA, 2005; Keleher, 1929), ethnic composition, and property rights 
regimes, the acequias are seen as fighting a battle against what could be called “moderniza-
tion” or integration into an unfamiliar culture (Rodriguez, 2006; Rivera, 1998; Peña, 2003).  
In New Mexico, water sales can be legally contested for several reasons (Nunn et al., 1991; 
Colby, 1995). One basis for contest is if the transfer is deemed to violate the “public wel-
fare” of the state (NM Statute72-5-231; Bokum, 1996; Rivera, 1996; Brown et al., 1996). 
New Mexico water law allows acequia associations to prohibit members from selling their 
rights if such a sale is deemed to be harmful to the functioning of the acequia (NM Stat-
utes 73-2-21.E, 73-3.4.1, 72-5-24.1; NMAA, 2005). Bokum’s draft framework for a public 
welfare regulation suggests that the New Mexico Office of the State Engineer (NMOSE) 
request a benefit-cost analysis for certain water rights sales. Including costs or benefits only 
in terms of agricultural sales will likely underestimate the true value of water in acequias, 
which contribute a suite of ecosystem services such as groundwater recharge and various 
cultural attributes. Despite this, the state of New Mexico has neither a clear definition of 
public welfare nor any pertinent legislation on the topic as it relates to water. This is not 
for lack of attempts to clarify public welfare (Rivera, 1996, 1998; Bokum 1996).  
Despite discussion about the public welfare values of acequia irrigation in the state of New 
Mexico (NM Statute72-5-23; Bokum, 1996; Rivera, 1998; Fleming et al., 2001; Peña, 2003), 
there is still relatively little research on willingness to pay to protect and maintain these sys-
tems (Archambault & Ulibarri, 2007). In this paper I report results from an open-ended 
(OE) contingent valuation method (CVM) survey to model the demand for acequia irriga-
tion and culture (Rivera, 1998) in New Mexico (NM), USA. Specifically, I examine the will-
ingness to pay (WTP) of residents of San Miguel County, in northeastern NM, for a train-
ing program designed to strengthen and perpetuate irrigation and culture on the acequias 
of El Río de las Gallinas. 
Ascertaining demand for acequia irrigation and culture as part of a broader effort to un-
cover preferences for water use and culture in New Mexico can be useful for prioritizing 
uses. Clear dollar values for the growth of industry or even municipalities can overshadow 
traditional uses which have less obvious worth. These values could be included in a formal 
cost benefit analysis of water transfers in the basin or region. 
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1.1 Background on Acequias 
Acequia-irrigated farms play an ever-smaller role in direct subsistence in the region (Rodri-
guez, 2006). Between 1997 and 2002, the number of farms in San Miguel County, the 
study area, decreased by 28%, while acres of farmed land decreased by 18% (NASS 2002a). 
Land use patterns in Alcalde, NM, show a 553% increase in residential use between1962 
and 2003, and a decrease in many crops, with orchard crop area decreasing by 69%, for ex-
ample, and only pasture area increasing, by 47% (Ortiz et al., 2007). This does not, howev-
er, mean that they are less important; in fact they generate many benefits. Rodriguez (2006) 
Rivera (1998), and Pena (2003), among others, describe their contributions to cultural in-
tegrity, mutuality, the continuation of Hispano religious traditions, and their potential to 
suggest alternative water management paradigms and their contributions of important hy-
drological ecosystem services (Fernald & Guldan, 2006; Fernald et al., 2007; MEA, 2005). 
Acequias, with their particular history of water rights and communal management struc-
ture, remain relatively intact in northern New Mexico. In the acequia system, water is his-
torically owned and distributed collectively (Simmons, 1972; Hutchins, 1928). Currently all 
water rights are private. The ditch association does not own water rights, only the individ-
ual irrigators. While the systems are usually governed by a fairly strict rotation scheme 
based on either acreage irrigated or simply on an even division of time, there is also a way 
that irrigators can share water during scarce times. On some ditches, each parciante is giv-
en an equal number of hours out of, for instance, fourteen days. On other ditches, irriga-
tion time depends on acreage, with smaller holders receiving less time. Maintenance duties 
are apportioned similarly, and with similar variation 
Parciantes often informally share water amongst themselves via negotiations with the 
mayordomo (ditch boss) and their neighbors. This sharing, known as the reparto or repar-
timiento (Rodríguez 2006; Rivera 1998) keeps water not only in the same basin, but the 
same ditch. The NM Office of the State Engineer (OSE) has the power to decide whether 
an out-of-basin water transfer is acceptable, but they are possible (Nunn et al 1991; John-
son et al 1981). 
Under the repartimiento, a farmer with senior water rights might allow a junior user to use 
a part of those rights for a specified period of time, without formally giving up the rights. 
When this takes place between different acequias, or between a group of acequias and an-
other entity, another term used is “shortage sharing.” The City of Las Vegas NM entered 
into a shortage sharing agreement with the acequias of the Gallinas River in 2006. Current 
drought conditions have resulted in negotiations over the sharing becoming extremely 
tense (J. Varela, New Mexico Acequia Association, personal communication with author). 
Additionally, acequia associations might negotiate planting different types of crops de-
pending on the snowpack. This commons approach to resource management was also ap-
plied to grazing cattle until quite recently in Hispano villages throughout northern New 
Mexico, and is not limited to agricultural decisions.  Nor is it limited to New Mexico. In-
gram & Brown (1998) make the point that such practices are part of a “water comity” 
which has existed in every desert society, and of course not just in the desert (Boelens & 
Davila, 1998; Berkes & Folke, 1998; Maas & Anderson, 1978), defined as “the observation 
of mutual courtesies.” It is composed of three aspects: dependability of the resource, par-
ticipation by pertinent communities, and opportunity for use in the future. Ingram & 
Brown (1998) make the point that approaching water from a community valued perspec-
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tive does in no way diminish its economic importance, and therefore does not preclude 
even the most conventional economic analyses. Rather it enriches the analytical context. 
The repartimiento allows reallocation of water within a community without users selling or 
trading their rights. Some advantages of this system over formal transfers are that it is a 
flexible system with relatively few transaction costs and that it keeps rights and therefore 
flows within the basin. The repartimiento is part of a greater constellation of what Rivera 
(1998) describes as “Acequia Culture” Rivera argues that acequia culture includes the con-
tinuity of Hispano traditions such as weaving and the carving of wooden saints or angels 
known as santos. 
The teaching of these traditions is embedded in the communal focus of the acequia towns. 
The traditional notion of water rights in these towns is shared and participatory, deriving 
from Spanish and Islamic water law, rather than from the contemporary US (Anglo) ideas 
of private ownership of rights (Hutchins, 1928; Keleher, 1929). If the communities stop ir-
rigating, Rivera argues, they stop working together. If they stop working together, they 
communicate less. This diminution of communication is the thin end of a wedge of cultur-
al disintegration that could lead to the disappearance of traditional ways of teaching arts 
and crafts. While tenacious individuals will always hang on to and even perhaps revive 
these crafts in the absence of a functioning community, they will be far less common than 
they are now. 
William Gonzales, a commissioner and irrigator in San Miguel County, argues that this lack 
of communication can permanently damage community-level governance. As people no 
longer work together or see each other on a regular basis, old interfamily disputes are more 
likely to persist, lands to be fenced off, and the community sets against itself, rather than 
working together to ensure provision of, for instance, water rights. Gonzales’ attitudes are 
borne out in the small farming community of San Augustine, south of Las Vegas, NM. In 
San Augustine, irrigators are beginning to work together at the límpia (yearly ditch cleaning) 
for the first time in decades, and are working together to sue the City of Las Vegas in order 
to guarantee the delivery of their water rights, which are senior to the City’s by approxi-
mately 30 years. Part of the reason the community lost access to its water was because 
people drifted away from agriculture, and substituted laborers during the limpia, or ignored 
it altogether. 
This exodus was due to a number of variables. The principal reason was World War II, 
during which a large number of young New Mexican men were drafted and in many in-
stances left their home counties and country for the first time in their lives. Other signifi-
cant influences on the outmigration include a massive drought in the late 1950s, younger 
residents’ joining the military during the Vietnam War, and a general move toward the City 
of Las Vegas (COLV) by many rural residents. Gonzales’ point is that when farming dis-
appears, a whole section of sub-municipal government disappears, and larger municipali-
ties gain control of agricultural water, further diminishing the character of the counties. 
967 
2  San Miguel County and El Río de las Gallinas 
The Gallinas rises above El Porvenir Canyon northwest of COLV in the southeastern 
Sangre de Cristo Mountains near Elk Mountain at an altitude of about 11,660 feet (Evans 
& Lindline, 2004; NMED, 2005; OSE, 1991), flowing roughly southeast before running 
through the City of Las Vegas, NM. Figure 1 shows the location of San Miguel County and 
the Gallinas River. 
According to Saavedra (1987), there are 11 acequias that irrigate on the Gallinas; according 
to the Rio de las Gallinas Acequia Association (RGAA) at the time I conducted interviews 
(Pers. Comm with Joseph Padilla, then president of RGAA), there were 21 (12 community, 
nine private) active ditches.  Speaking with Richard Cozens, the current president, that 
number has decreased to about “13 operating community acequias and three to four 
private ditches.” There are also two unadjudicated springs whose water is used for 
irrigation, two ditches whose existence is in doubt, one that is somewhere between being 
community and private, and several that no longer operate but are still discussed. The 
ditches and some infrastructure (e.g. headgates) still exist but no one uses them, as no one 
lives in the communities any more. However, they are so recently abandoned that they 
persist as part of the greater acequia community. 
Fig. 1.  Location of San Miguel County in the State 
of New Mexico 
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There are three principal reaches on the Gallinas: upstream of the municipal diversion dam 
in Montezuma (upstream ditches), within city limits (middle ditches), and downstream of 
COLV’s effluent return (downstream ditches). Above the municipal diversion are the 
villages of El Porvenir to Montezuma, and this reach includes the Placita Arriba, Upper 
Maestas, Maestas, and Luis Martinez ditches. The Middle Reach includes the Los Vigiles 
ditch above COLV, the Roundhouse ditch, los Romeros ditch, and the Acequia Madre de 
Las Vegas. South of COLV the river flows through the abandoned village Los Fuertes, San 
Augustine, and then on through the abandoned villages of Bereda Blanca, La Liendre and 
Chaperito before sometimes flowing in to the Pecos River near Dilia, NM, in Guadalupe 
County. 
2.1 Community Characteristics 
San Miguel County is located in the northeast of the state, east of the capital Santa Fe. It 
has an area of 4,717 square miles and a population of 29,301 out of New Mexico’s total 
population of 2,082,22438. The county is roughly 76% Hispanic, roughly 20% Anglo, with 
about 3% Native and 2% Black residents. Median household income is $32,213, consider-
ably below the state median of $43,820. Approximately one fourth (24.8%) of the county’s 
population lives below the poverty line, compared with 18.4% of the state’s population. 
The Gallinas basin was settled relatively late for northern New Mexico (Arellano et al., 1998). 
The first settlers moved in after the establishment of San Miguel del Bado in 1794, and the 
grant of Las Vegas Grandes was founded in 1823 (NMED, 2005). Diversion dates on the 
Gallinas can seem recent compared to dates in other basins (Rodriguez, 2006; Hutchins, 
1928). This late settlement is due to the fact that the original Spanish explorers came up the 
Rio Grande (Rivera, 2006), only crossing the Pecos Valley later and also in part, due to the 
persistence of the Comanche Nation (Arellano et al., 1998). Comanche continued to raid 
Hispano settlements into the early 20th Century; parciantes recounted stories of their parents 
or grandparents being attacked or in one case killed by Comanche in the late 19th or early 20th 
centuries (Pers. Comm with respondents during interviews conducted by author in 2006-8). 
3  Values of Agricultural Ecosystem Services and Culture 
Ecosystem services are generally thought to be best provided by relatively pristine wetlands 
and forests (DeGroot et al., 2002; DeGroot et al., 2006). Agricultural land provides a varie-
ty of ecosystem services, such as open space (Kline & Wichelns, 1994, 1996a, 1996b; Ade-
laja et al., 2006; Adelaja & Lake, 2007; Plantinga & Miller., 2001), wildlife habitat (Nicker-
son & Lynch 2001), and groundwater recharge (Smith 2006; Fernald et al., 2007; Fernald & 
Guldan, 2006). This constellation of amenities is also addressed in the agriculture multi-
functionality literature (Drake, 1992; Randall, 2002: Rønningen et al., 2004; Groenfeldt, 
2005). Table 1 displays results from valuation work on agriculture and some other cultural 
ecosystem services.  
Swinton et al. (2007) compare results from a choice experiment (CE) and a method called 
“Analytical Hierarchy Process” to ascertain how the Scottish public views various ways to 
improve agricultural sustainability. Lockwood et al. (1996), comparing competing uses in-
volving two nonmarket (and cultural) resources, measure the value of grazing in the Aus-
tralian Alps. Much like New Mexico, grazing in the alpine areas is regarded as inherent to 
the local culture, even though many Australians recognize the environmental damage these 
practices can create. 
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Australians recognize the environmental damage these practices can create. Johnston et al. 
(2001) compare results from a contingent choice survey and hedonic pricing research to 
assess non-market values for different types of agricultural land in Suffolk County NY. 
Halstead (1984) found that WTP to preserve agricultural land near the respondents’ homes 
in three towns in Massachusetts increased as intensity of suggested development increased 
and found a value of up to $176.06 per household to avoid heavy development. 
The valuation of culture is somewhat more complicated. Defining culture is not as 
straightforward as defining ecosystem services, complicated as that can be. The Conven-
tion for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (UNESCO, 2003) defines “intan-
gible cultural heritage” as the “practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills     
–as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith– that 
communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural her-
itage.” The Convention states that this heritage can manifest in “oral traditions and expres-
sions, performing arts, social practices, rituals, and festive events, knowledge and practices 
concerning nature and the universe, and traditional craftsmanship.” 
Table 1. Valuation research on agricultural land and indigenous culture 
Authors Year Good valued Location WTP* Currency 2008 US$ 
Han et al. 2008 Pre-Buddhist re-
mains 
Korea ₩254.43 Korean 
Won (2008) 
$2.12/hh: 
Swinton et 
al. 
2007 Options for agri-
environmental poli-
cy: Environmental 
improvements 
Scotland 
₤50.94 - 
₤55.27 
GB₤(2006) 
$106.48-
$115.50 
Rural Development ₤50.07 - 
₤74.01 
$106.00-   
$154.72 
Noonan 2003 Meta-analysis on 
cultural goods 
Worldwide $42.78 US$ (2002) $50.13 
Boxall et al. 2003 Canoeists’ WTP to 
see pristine aborigi-
nal rock art  
Canada $77† Not stated, 
assumed to 
be 2003 
CA$ 
Johnston et 
al. 
2001 Protection of dif-
ferent types of agri-
cultural land 
USA $1,199/acre
/year 
US$ (2001) $1460.48 
Lockwood et 
al. 
1996 WTP to stop cattle 
grazing 
Australia $30 
AU$ 1996 
$39.31 
WTP to continue 
grazing but mitigate 
ecological effects 
$73 $95.67 
Halstead 1984 WTP to avoid de-
velopment on sur-
rounding farmland 
USA $176.06 US$ (1984) $365.34 
Notes: *WTP is listed as per household (/hh) except †, which is per respondent at an on-site survey. 
Currency conversions used http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi and 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/Research/data/us/calc/ both accessed May 30, 2008 
Conversions contemporary at time of research. 
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While there is a cultural economics literature, it tends to focus on cultural goods such as 
symphonies and museums (Noonan, 2003; Rushton, 1999). There is not an extensive liter-
ature on how to value cultural-behavior attributes. Throsby (2003) argues that this is not 
necessarily a problem, as “a distinguishing feature of cultural goods is that acquiring a taste 
for them takes time, i.e. they are classed as experiential or addictive goods, where demand 
is cumulative, and hence dynamically unstable (p. 277).” One result of this is that non-
market valuation methods might not fully capture WTP from insufficiently informed par-
ticipants. 
Another issue raised by Throsby (2003) is that cultural goods could be seen by individuals 
as playing an important role in the utility function of a larger group, and therefore WTP 
values might not be well-captured via individual utilities. Rushton (1999) argues that con-
ventional economic valuation techniques, predicated on Methodological Individualism, 
start from given behavior without research into what formed that behavior, and do not 
necessarily capture the societal value of cultural goods for much the same reason. 
Noonan (2003) provides a meta-analysis of the valuation work on cultural goods, review-
ing 65 CVM studies on cultural resources. Boxall et al. (2003), using a combined revealed- 
and stated-preference approach, examine canoeists’ values for pristine or defaced aborigi-
nal rock paintings along canoe routes in Canada’s Precambrian shield area. Han et al. 
(2008) conducted a choice experiment to ascertain the value of natural resource damages 
arising from the construction of a large dam on the Tong River in Korea. They described 
four attributes: Forest, Fauna, Flora, and Remains, defined as “protection levels of histori-
cal remains (p. 258).” This last attribute showed the highest mean WTP, at 254.43 
(US$2.12) Korean Won per household. This suggests that this sample valued cultural ser-
vices most highly for this project. Aggregating these values across the households in the af-
fected population, total WTP for the entire population was approximately 209.9 billion 
Korean Won (US $ 174.9 million) per year. The authors recalculated the project’s pro-
posed benefit cost ratio (BCR), which changed from 1.02 to 0.85. At any point below uni-
tary (where BCR=1), a project cannot be recommended on a cost-benefit basis. 
4  Contingent Valuation 
In a CVM survey, respondents are presented with a hypothetical scenario, a specific change 
(or set of changes) in an environmental program or policy, a payment vehicle, and then an 
economic choice. Specifically, respondents are asked to make statements about their willing-
ness to pay (“WTP”) or to willingness to accept (“WTA”) compensation for the proposed 
changes in environmental quality or access. Common elicitation formats for asking valuation 
questions include both open-ended (“OE”) and closed-ended formats (Bishop et al., 1995). 
The latter includes the dichotomous choice (“DC”) format where respondents must either 
accept or reject a given payment amount for the proposed change in environmental quality 
or access. DC formats include the hypothetical referendum format, as advocated by Arrow 
et al. (1993). Payment card (“PC”) is another closed-ended format, wherein respondents are 
given a set of value options to choose from. 
There is support for both formats. Arrow et al. (1993) recommend DC, while Boyle (2003) 
states that OE might have an advantage over other formats as it avoids bid anchoring. DC 
more closely approximates a market, as consumers are given prices, rather than asked to de-
termine them, and OE questions might be more challenging for some respondents, which 
could result in non-response or underestimation of WTP (Loomis & White, 1996). Cameron 
et al. (2002) find that OE formats tend to produce more conservative WTP estimates than 
DC. In this research, I use OE, and apply the Tobit model (Boyle, 2003), which doesn’t al-
971 
low negative values and accommodates a probability spike at zero ($0). I also use a referen-
dum question and analyze those values using a Logit model (see below). 
4.1 Survey Design 
I conducted interviews about the valuation question with stakeholders from the irrigating 
community; irrigators from the Río de las Gallinas Acequia Association in Las Vegas NM, 
and the villages of Embudo and Cañon, NM, and staff from the NM Office of the State En-
gineer and New Mexico Legal Aid. After several iterations, the good provided was a training 
program for acequia farmers that included material on dryland farming techniques, water 
law, and conservation methods. This program would seek to: 
1. Strengthen traditional culture and practices
2. Strengthen community ties
3. Improve communication between acequia-irrigated farms and state water
agencies
4. Help conserve water on acequia-irrigated farms
5. Help acequia-irrigated farms adapt to climate change
After initial development of the instrument, contents and presentation were refined using 
focus group-type interviews with both irrigating and non-irrigating residents in Ribera and 
Las Vegas, NM. The survey was given to 10 people in interview format to test for compre-
hension and to ensure that as far as possible the survey instrument was unbiased1. Respond-
ents were asked to describe any difficulties or problems they had with the survey. Attitudinal 
and demographic questions were included to facilitate interpretation of WTP results and 
check for sample representativeness. The 20-page survey is attached as Appendix 1. 
The survey began with questions regarding use of water in San Miguel County, knowledge of 
acequia irrigation issues, knowledge of and opinions about cultural issues relating to acequias. 
The actual valuation question came in four parts: a description of the program, a hypothet-
ical referendum question, a description of the payment mechanism and the valuation ques-
tion itself. 
The first part was a description of the training program. Respondents were then asked to 
rank how important, if at all, they felt such a program would be, on a score of 1 (Not Im-
portant) to 5 (Extremely Important). The survey described a hypothetical referendum, which 
asked whether participants would vote “yes” or “no” to a designation of the program. This 
was followed by a question about payment. The payment vehicle was a one-time payment di-
rectly into a fund administered by a “combination of Acequia Associations, and other local 
groups.” If respondents answered “yes” to the latter question, they were asked to indicate 
the maximum their household would be willing to contribute. The survey concluded with an 
opportunity to discuss reasons for their support or lack of support for the designation attitu-
dinal questions, and standard demographic questions. 
The survey was mailed to a sample of 1500 residents of San Miguel County, randomly select-
ed from a voter registration list. The survey was designed to be sent by mail due to a relative-
ly low level of internet connectivity in the county at the time. The adjusted response rate (ad-
justed for 12 undeliverable surveys) was 9.5 %, providing a potential usable sample of 
n=143. 
1These participants were recruited via radio announcements on Frank Splendoria’s show “The Back Porch” 
on KNMX AM and postings in the community announcements sections of several newspapers: the Las Ve-
gas Optic and the Santa Fe New Mexican, which were described to me as the most commonly read papers in 
the area. 
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5 Empirical Results 
The sample in this research is not representative of the county. Compared to the county as a 
whole, this sample is better-educated and with a higher income than the county means2.  An-
glos are a greater proportion of the sample than of the county, though the sample and the 
county are both about 50% female. Rural residents make up approximately 30% of this sam-
ple, but 50% of the population. 
5.1 Referendum Results 
Based on prior experience and the literature, it seemed that several variables would influence 
the decisions both to vote for the program and the WTP decision. Political affiliation could 
have an effect on the decision to vote for the program, as it could be hypothesized that more 
conservative respondents would not favor programs using state funds to support what is es-
sentially a private undertaking. There was very little variation in the category of political affil-
iation, so these variables were not used in the regression. I had also thought that whether a 
respondent farmed or belonged to an acequia would be meaningful. So few acequia irrigators 
(n=22) or agriculturists (n=23) responded that I was unable to include those categories in my 
regressions.  
There were also attitudinal questions that would have been important, such as how the re-
spondent felt about irrigated agriculture in San Miguel County, such as how they felt about 
selling water rights. While there was sufficient variation in many of these responses, and an 
Table 2. Selected descriptive statistics for San Miguel County
US Census 
2000 
This research (standard errors in paren-
theses) 
Population 29,325 N=143 
Mean In-
come* 
$13,268 $48,021 (35,721.7) 
%Hispanic 77 51 (0.50) 
%Anglo 20 35 (0.48) 
% Female 51 46 (0.50) 
% of popula-
tion living in 
an urban area 
50 30 (0.46) 
Notes: 
*Mean income in sample calculated as follows: midpoint was calculated per in-
come category except the two highest. The two highest were left as $150,000 
and $200,000. There were so few respondents in those categories that the low-
est value was selected so as not to skew the categorical means. A mean was then 
calculated for the entire sample. 
** % of population living in urban area defined in this research as respondent 
self-identifying as such. In Census data, I used the population of Las Vegas di-
vided by the population of San Miguel County. 
2 Pearson’s Chi-Squared test finds a highly significant difference in education levels between this research 
and that reported in the 2000 US Census (χ2=24.07, p-value=0.0001).
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adequate number of responses, many of these variables proved to have no significance in the 
models, and were dropped. Two variables that were consistently significant were the ques-
tions on paying higher water rates (HIRATE) in the future and on selling water rights 
(SELRIGHT). It is difficult to make predictions about the effect of income3 on the decision 
to vote on the referendum. As that decision is costless, income should not make a difference. 
In terms of ethnicity, it is assumed that as the acequias are seen as a Hispanic heritage, 
whether the respondent is Hispanic might have a positive effect on the decision to vote 
YES. Therefore the models included an ethnicity dummy4(Hispanic=1, other=0), and a loca-
tion variable (rural=1, urban=0). With a few exceptions, the hypotheses in both this section 
and the section on WTP are presented in two ways. The first presentation will be a one-tailed 
t-test examining whether the mean from one group is different from another. The same idea 
will then be restated in a two-tailed way that allows for examining the sign on the coefficient 
of the variable in question. As such there are different cutoffs for significance in each case.   
This motivates the first hypothesis about voting behavior: Hispanic respondents are more 
likely to vote YES for the program than Anglo respondents. In terms of model testing, this 
can be stated as follows: that the coefficient on the Hispanic dummy is expected to be great-
er than zero, or:  
H1VOTE: βHispanic>0 
If a respondent is urban5, it seems plausible that they might see the acequias as a contender 
for their water. This would make urban residents less likely to support acequia culture pro-
grams financially. The few ditches in the City of Las Vegas are unlikely to make a difference. 
The opposite would likely hold true for rural residents. With acequias being in general a rural 
phenomenon, there might be more support for them in rural communities.   
The HIRATE variable designates response to the question “We will probably need to pay 
higher water rates in the future.” Possible responses were a 0-5 Likert-type scale, with higher 
values signifying stronger agreement with the statement. The HIRATE variable was modi-
fied to be a dummy variable. Due to a lack of variation in the variable, the upper two catego-
ries of response, 4 and 5, were combined to form the new dummy HIRATEHI, the rest of 
the categories (1,2, and 3) were combined as HIRATELO. HIRATEHI produced better-
performing models and marginal effects. HIRATELO was not used in the regressions.  
This motivates a second hypothesis, that rural respondents are more likely to vote for the 
program than are urban respondents. In terms of model testing, this hypothesis can be re-
written as:  
H2VOTE: βrural>0 
 Whether the respondent thinks that paying higher water rates in the future is largely an eco-
nomic question, and its relevance to the voting decision is difficult to predict. However, the 
question on selling water rights is meant to proxy attitudes about keeping traditional practic-
es in use, so the more a respondent agrees with the statement that selling water rights sepa-
rately from one’s land is not related to community opinion, the less the respondent is likely 
concerned with maintaining traditional community values of water management, and there-
fore the less they would be concerned with providing the program. This, then, motivates the 
third and final hypothesis on voting behavior, that those who agree with the SELRIGHT 
3 In the regressions, income was broken into five categories, <$24,999/yr, $25,000-$39,999/yr, $40,000-
$59,999/yr, $60,000-$99,999/yr, and $100,000-$200,000/yr. 
4 The self-identifying ethnicity question is taken from the US census; HISPANIC is whether respondents 
self-identify as Hispanic.  
5 Self-identifying as living in an urban area, as opposed to a rural area-RURAL.
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question will be more likely to vote YES for the program than those who disagree. Follow-
ing the above arguments, this can be rewritten as:  
H3VOTE: βsellright>0 
Table 3 describes the expected effects of selected variables on the dependent 
variable VOTE.  
Table 3. Predicted Effects of Independent Variables on the dependent variable 
VOTE. 
Hypothesis Variable Expected sign 
INC ? 
H1VOTE HISPANIC + 
H2VOTE RURAL + 
HIRATEHI ? 
H3VOTE SELRIGHT - 
Table 4: Responses to the Referendum Question and Descriptives for Explanatory Variables 
Overall Sample  
(percentages in parentheses) 
Anglo Hispanic Urban Rural 
N= 129 47 70 36 88 
YES 91 (70.5%) 34(72%) 48(69%) 21(58%) 66(75%) 
NO 38 13 22 15 22 
HISPANIC 85 - - 57 28 
RURAL 91 34 41 - - 
SELLRT* 134 48 72 91 39 
DISAGREE 66 29 30 47 17 
NEUTRAL 23 7 14 19 4 
AGREE 45 12 28 25 18 
HIRATEHI 103 40 52 70 30 
Notes: 
*: “To what extent, if any, do you agree with the statement “People should be able to sell their water rights 
separately from their land, no matter what the community thinks.” Five-point Likert-type question with 1= dis-
agree strongly, 2=disagree somewhat, 3=neutral, 4=agree somewhat, 5=agree strongly. The category “disagree” 
captures a 1 or a 2; “neutral” is a 3, “agree” is a 4 or a 5.  
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Table 4 shows responses to the vote question by subcategory. The program was supported 
by all major stakeholder groups, with “yes” receiving a majority vote among Anglos, Hispan-
ics, urban, and rural residents. The program passed with a YES vote of 70.5% in the whole 
sample.  This research could be said to present with 95% confidence that between 60 and 
80% of San Miguel County residents support the designation of the acequia training pro-
gram69. This is a considerable degree of variation, and representative accuracy would be im-
proved by increasing the sample size. Despite that, it appears that the measure would in gen-
eral be supported by residents of San Miguel County. 
The rural group voted YES at 75%, and the urban group voted YES at 58%. A two-sample 
t-test found a significant difference between rural and urban residents at the 10% level (t = 
1.8517, P > |t| = 0.0665). Hispanic voters supported the program at 69%, as compared to 
others at 72%. A two-sample t-test found no significant difference in voting behavior by 
ethnicity (Hispanic=1, Anglo = 0) (t = -0.4331, P >|t| = 0.6658). 
5.2  Vote Data Modeling 
I used a Logit model to model the responses to the referendum question. The Logit model 
is a binary-choice dependent variable model, which assumes a logistic distribution of the 
error term. The Logit uses Maximum Likelihood Estimation to obtain σ2, and the vector of 
coefficients β. The variable y* is used in the index function, and in this model takes the 
values of either 0 or 1. The zero value indicates that a choice was not made, and a one (1) 
indicates that it was. However, we do not actually observe the utility function, simply the 
outcome of whether utility derived from some action is sufficient to undertake it (1) or not 
(0). 
The likelihood function is given by: 
  (1.1) 
Taking logs70, the Log-likelihood function for the Logit model is: 
  (1.2) 
I used the model to determine the probability that a respondent would vote “yes” to the 
referendum question (Q10) for a given set of demographic characteristics and a given set 
of responses to the survey questions. The wording of the question is: 
Suppose the designation of the Acequia Farmer Training Program was subject of a non-
binding, countywide advisory referendum, where the results were provided to county, 
state, and local policy-makers. Would you vote Yes (for the designation) or No (against the 
designation)? 
Based on the hypotheses in Table 3, I tested three specifications of Logit models. Table 5 
shows results including marginal effects from the Logit estimations. 
The Logit models generally showed reasonable performance based on McFadden’s R2 
(~0.20), and the variables behaved generally as predicted. The coefficients for the Logit 
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model are not usable as probabilities, and so marginal effects were also calculated, in order 
to analyze dy/dx. For the significant variables in specification 1, marginal effects can be in-
terpreted as follows. For income, a change of one income category would increase the 
probability of voting “YES” by 4%; as a respondent’s agreement with the statement about 
paying higher water rates increased by one category, the probability of their voting “YES” 
increases by 8-34%.  The marginal effects of a respondent’s living in a rural area are slightly 
significant only in one instance, and as such it is hard to determine marginal effects in that 
case, but the effects were 10-18%, depending on model specification. 
Income is consistently positively and significantly correlated with that decision. The re-
spondent’s being Hispanic was negative but not significant, so we can reject the second 
hypothesis. The third hypothesis, that the selright variable would be positively correlated 
with VOTE, cannot be rejected. 
Table 5. Variable parameters and marginal effects† (MFX) from Logit Model Estimations 
Variables 1 MFX 2 MFX 3 MFX 
INTERCEPT -2.60** (1.05) -2.18**(0.84) -2.73**(1.05) 
INC 0.23***(0.07) 0.04***(0.01) 0.23***(0.07) 0.04***(0.01) 0.21***(0.69) 0.04***(0.01) 
HISPANIC -0.34(0.54) -0.05(0.08) -0.29(0.51) -0.05(0.08) - - 
RURAL 1.02*(0.54) 0.18*(0.10) 0.93*(0.53) 0.16(0.10) 0.99*(0.51) 0.10(0.10) 
HIRATEHI 1.73***(0.55) 0.34***(0.12) 1.62***(0.54) 0.32***(0.12) 0.49**(0.21) 0.08**8(0.11) 
SELLRT 0.11*(1.05) 0.02(0.03) - - - - 
Pseudo R2 0.2061 0.2008 0.1982 
N 111 112 112 
χ2 25.84*** 25.29*** 24.96*** 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1%  level
† dy/dx is for a discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
5.3  WTP Results 
Previous research and experience during other phases of data collection motivate a set of 
behavioral hypotheses related to WTP.  Table 6 describes the expected effects of variables 
on the dependent variable WTP. 
Table 6. Predicted Effects of Independent Variables on the dependent variable WTP. 
Hypothesis Variable Expected sign 
H1WTP INC + 
H2WTP HISPANIC + 
H3WTP RURAL + 
HIRATEHI ? 
H4WTP SELRIGHT - 
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H4WTP SELRIGHT - 
Table 7 provides the distribution of sample responses to the willingness to pay question. 
The sample mean was $25.00/hh, with a standard deviation of $54.48. While the minimum 
was $0.00 and the maximum was $500.00, that maximum value was an outlier. There were 
87 zero-valued responses, 61.7% of the total response. Of those who responded, 59.7% of 
Hispanics and 57% of Anglos chose a zero-valued response. Forty-four out of 91 YES 
voters (48.4%) chose a WTP response of zero. The mean Anglo WTP was $29.22, and 
mean Hispanic WTP was $17.74. A two-sample t-test revealed a statistically significant dif-
ference between Anglo and Hispanic WTP at the 5% level (t = -1.9593, P > |t| = 0.0524).  
Rural mean WTP was $32.58, and urban $12.20.  T-tests revealed a significant difference 
between urban and rural WTP (t = 1 .9728, P > |t| = 0.0507) at the 5% level. 
Table 8. Variable coefficients and marginal effects† (MFX) from Tobit model 
estimations 
Variables 1 MFX 2 MFX 3 MFX 
INTERCEPT -2.60** (1.05)  -2.18**(0.84)  -2.73**(1.05) 
INC 0.23***(0.07) 0.04***(0.01) 0.23***(0.07) 0.04***(0.01) 0.21***(0.69) 0.04***(0.01) 
HISPANIC -0.34(0.54) -0.05(0.08) -0.29(0.51) -0.05(0.08) - - 
RURAL 1.02*(0.54) 0.18*(0.10) 0.93*(0.53) 0.16(0.10) 0.99*(0.51) 0.10(0.10) 
HIRATEHI 1.73***(0.55) 0.34***(0.12) 1.62***(0.54) 0.32***(0.12) 0.49**(0.21) 0.08**8(0.11) 
SELLRT 0.11*(1.05) 0.02(0.03) - - - - 
Pseudo R2 0.2061 0.2008 0.1982 
N 111 112 112 
χ2 25.84*** 25.29*** 24.96*** 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1%  level
† dy/dx is for a discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics on Willingness to Pay. 
Description N Mean SD Min Max 
Sample 143 $25.35 54.48 0 500 
Hispanics 73 $17.74 28.52 0 100 
Anglos 58 $29.22 45.26 0 200 
Male 65 $31.31 71.54 0 500 
Female 65 $21.85 33.91 0 100 
Rural 91 $32.58 63.53 0 500 
Urban 50 $12.20 28.20 0 100 
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5.4  WTP Data Modeling 
Given the design of the open-ended (OE) valuation question (Question 11), I estimate 
several single-equation willingness to pay (WTP) models: 
  (2.1) 
where x is a vector of characteristics for household i, and β is the vector of corresponding 
parameters to be estimated. A primary consideration in estimating WTP is that WTP 
responses from survey data often consist of numerous zeroes. In these data there were 87 
zero responses out of a total of 141.  Because so many observations of the WTP variable 
are zero-valued, classical linear regression methods are not appropriate66, 71, 70, and the Tobit 
(or Tobin’s Probit) model is recommended to estimate the WTP function. The Tobit 
model is a censored regression model on a continuous dependent variable that assumes an 
error term with a standard normal distribution. 
Maddala70and Greene71 state that censoring a distribution is required if the researcher only 
wants to record values of y* with values greater than some constant c, in this case, c=0, so 
the Tobit model uses WTP values greater than zero, and the distribution must be censored 
at zero, resulting in what Greene calls the “censored normal” distribution. In WTP 
research, “protest votes” of $0.00 are common72. To ensure that the distribution integrates 
to one, it should be scaled up by the probability that an observation in the uncensored 
population falls in the range of interest. This is essentially the transformation carried out by 
the Tobit model. In this case a new random variable y is presented such that: 
,   (2.2) 
  (2.3) 
The Tobit makes the mean in the censored normal distribution correspond to a standard 
normal distribution, allowing a conventional regression on the new transformed 
distribution. The Tobit model is formulated in terms of an index function: 
where  households    (2.4) 
  (2.5) 
 (2.6) 
where  is a vector of parameters on the independent variables xi, and ei is the error 
term. Here we can see how the Tobit in this instance simply replaces the dependent 
variable of interest WTP* for y* of the general form, and only performs the regression for 
observed values above zero.The log-likelihood function is: 
  (2.7) 
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Table 8 shows results including marginal effects and estimated WTP ( ) from the Tobit 
estimations. 
The models in general predicted higher WTP (approximately $30.00) than the sample 
means. Model performance was low, with a pseudo (McFadden) R2 of less than 0.03. In all 
models, INC was positively significantly correlated with WTP, as predicted. The ethnicity 
dummy tended to be negative, but not significant. RURAL was positive and significant in 
each model, as expected, and HIRATEHI proved to be positive and significant in each 
model. 
Just as in the Logit model, coefficients from direct estimation of the Tobit model do not 
provide probabilities, so in order to calculate dy/dx, marginal effects must be calculated. 
Marginal effects for the significant variables can be interpreted as follows. An increase of 
one income category increases WTP by 7%. Agreeing with the statement that “we will 
probably have to pay higher water rates in the future,” as opposed to either being neutral 
or disagreeing with it, increases WTP by around 70%.  This effect is greater than income 
or any other variable. The RURAL variable was not significant in the marginal effects cal-
culations.  
H1 is not rejected, but coefficients and marginal effects were insignificant for H3 and for 
H4. The actual 95% confidence interval is between $24 and $26.  This is low compared to 
some other research: Swinton et al. (2007) found values in excess of $100.00 for either “ru-
ral development,” or “environmental programs” and Noonan (2003) found mean values 
equivalent to $50.13 per household for various cultural goods. 
6  Discussion and Policy Implications 
One objective of this research was to ascertain residents’ values for acequia irrigation and 
therefore culture in San Miguel County. There was both a high level of support (70.5%) 
and a positive WTP (μ = $25.00/hh) for the program, though a majority of supporters had 
a WTP of $0.00. Rural residents voted yes at a higher level (75% vs. 58%) and showed a 
higher WTP ($35.28 vs. $12.20) than the urban population. This is not surprising, though it 
contradicts Gardner’s (1977) assertion that benefits of farmland preservation principally 
accrue to urban residents. Furuseth (1987) finds support for a “sociospatial” hypothesis, 
which suggests that support for protection programs is widely distributed in communities, 
and reflects a growing concern about rapid development in rural areas. 
An unexpected result of this research is that Hispanics’ WTP ($17.74) for the program was 
much lower than that of Anglos ($29.22). While it is possible that Hispanics do not value 
acequia culture as highly as Anglos, there are several other explanations. Income disparities 
can explain differences in WTP, but breaking income into categories8, a Pearson’s χ2 test 
shows no significant difference between Hispanics and Anglos (χ2 = 0.7126, p-value = 
0.8702)9. So the answer does not appear to lie in income differences. 
It is important to discuss some perceptions of the differences between Anglos and Hispan-
ics in a New Mexican context. This is a large and entire area of study distinct from the sort 
of valuation exercise I conduct here, and I will discuss it only briefly as a background. The 
part of the USA that is now New Mexico was part of Spain and then Mexico until 1848 
when it became a territory and then 1912 when it became a state (Keleher, 1929). The arri-
val of essentially an Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and property rights regime (Simmons, 
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1972; Hutchins, 1928) has never been fully integrated. Rather it has been grafted onto the 
“traditional” mix of Spanish and Indigenous property rights structures (Hall, 2012; Rivera, 
2006). 
During interviews I conducted between 2006-2008 in San Miguel County (Raheem, 2008), 
and based on ongoing conversations with local irrigators and scholars, some Hispanics still 
do not recognize the authority of, for instance, US Federal land management agencies, es-
pecially in uplands which were historically common grazing land (Pers. Comm with Es-
tevan Arellano, October, 2005; Rivera, 1998; Rodriguez, 2006). This undercurrent of dis-
satisfaction and mutual distrust runs back as far as the United States has held 
administrative sway over the area, and runs both ways. Nieto-Phillips (2004) cites New 
York Times articles expressing suspicion about the loyalties of the “Mexican” residents of 
the territory during the Mexican-AmericanWar. 
Along the Gallinas, “newcomers” are generally thought to be Anglo, but they are often 
Hispanic. Several irrigators describe new Hispanic families moving onto their ditches. Ad-
ditionally, one mayordomo points out that new Anglo irrigators are often intensely con-
cerned about being seen as outsiders, are receptive to traditions and local power structures, 
and make good neighbors. 
One informant tells me of a conflict that ran for decades. “At one time he [the mayor-
domo] was having problems with the first Anglo on the ditch. He [the Anglo] would take 
all the water. Downstream users would not get any unless there was an abundance [of wa-
ter]. He is still doing that. One irrigator was complaining that he didn’t get any water. [The 
mayordomo] was self-employed. The irrigator asked him “why do you accept the responsi-
bility of mayordomo if you have another job?” My husband had to go to the irrigator [‘s 
gate] in the middle of the night, and would turn the water on at the headgate. The Anglo 
also had a key. [There was] no enforcement available to the mayordomo. Was it because 
the man was an Anglo, a wealthy Anglo, or a wealthy established Anglo?” This informant 
feels that the Hispanics took a back seat, but was not really sure why. 
Bardhan (1993; p. 90) states “contact with outsiders and the option to exit reduce the ef-
fectiveness of social norms and the validity of the “common knowledge” assumption.” 
The “option to exit” seems more salient in the acequia example. Conversations both dur-
ing the interviews and the experiment suggest that until recently, few families sold their 
land or water rights. With the high property prices in certain counties, cash-poor irrigators 
and farmers rationally see opportunity in newcomers. So while “contact with outsiders” 
might provide the “option to exit,” it is really the latter which drives change in these villag-
es. On most of the Gallinas, the communities are so small that newcomers would be hard 
pressed to really change the norms structures in place. Throughout my interviews, and in 
ongoing communications with irrigators, there is still the persistent sense that Anglos and 
outsiders are causing most of the problems. 
One explanation for the difference in WTP could lie in culture. Hispanic parciantes are not 
part of the dominant European culture in the US. Watkins (2005) refers to such a group as 
“intra-nationalist,” describing them as “indigenous populations or other cultural, social, or 
religious enclaves within source nations (p. 79).” This intra-nationality could lead to one of 
the three problems brought up by Adamowicz et al. (2004, p. 53): “difficulties in aggregat-
ing indigenous and non-indigenous responses.” Differences between traditional Hispano 
and Anglo property rights regimes might also be at the heart of this valuation disparity, 
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with many Hispanics viewing water as a collectively owned good, rather than a privately 
owned one, which is the view taken by the prior appropriations doctrine. 
Additionally, this research addresses cultural goods, which, while certainly not racially ex-
clusive like aboriginal hunting rights, are here based in a non-Anglo society. During my in-
terviews, conversations with ranchers and santeros (carvers of wooden saints) show a con-
sistent feeling of betrayal and the robbery of Hispano heritage by Anglos over New 
Mexican history from territory to present. The notion that anyone would ask people to pay 
for a program to train them to do what they’re already trying to do might seem insulting. 
Another issue, discussed by Adamowicz et al. (1998) is how indigenous or traditional so-
cieties may have difficulty seeing certain goods as substitutable, either for each other or 
even for money. Many of the irrigators I interviewed spoke of acequia communities only 
recently being integrated into a cash economy. Many of these parciantes grew up in a bar-
ter economy, with “normal” cash transactions taking place with non-acequia goods, such 
as gasoline. Even automobiles could be obtained via barter (Peña, 2003). Godoy et al. 
(1995) found that, for the Summu Indians of Nicaragua, increases in cash incomes resulted 
in a “decline in the economic importance of forest goods in household incomes.” While 
this is a broad comparison, something similar seems borne out in certain acequia commu-
nities, as integration into a cash economy makes the production of agricultural products 
less important to many individuals. With these products becoming less important, and 
sometimes not having a cash value to begin with, the related cultural aspects of acequia ir-
rigation might not be seen as substitutable for money. Venn & Quiggin (2007) also address 
this issue of non-substitutability, particularly with respect to sacred values in indigenous 
cultures, and recommend quantity-based rather than price-based substitutions in some in-
digenous resource-use policy analysis. 
It is incorrect to state that the Hispanic community in San Miguel County values acequia 
culture less than any other group. Rather it seems that the proxy program or the payment 
mechanism somehow insufficiently represents or fits culture. If stakeholders and research-
ers are looking for a way to value acequia irrigation, culture, or even ecosystem services, we 
will have to conduct more extensive discussions in order to find a delta q that more closely 
represents the cultural asset I am here seeking to value. It is important to recognize the his-
toric cultural disparities that prevail or persist in the region, and come to terms with them 
to make this sort of research effective. 
One specific recommendation to any researcher involved in WTP research pertaining to 
acequias is to examine the subject community as thoroughly as possible. Much existing 
scholarship on acequias is by long-time residents of New Mexico. At least some future re-
search will be conducted by outsiders. If economists using conventional welfare measures 
do not understand the underlying hierarchies, beliefs, and other issues of the groups sur-
veyed, then their results will not be as informative as they could be. Additionally, some 
groups might simply oppose WTP as a useful measure. If WTP is to be used as a proxy for 
public welfare (as economic theory recommends) then we need to understand very clearly 
how different groups see WTP. If I had conducted this research with a Pueblo irrigating 
community, and found that their WTP was lower than their Anglo neighbors’, how would 
we reconcile that? It might be important to examine what alternative measures can be 
used. 
A second, broader objective is to motivate discussion about performing this kind of valua-
tion at all, and to get agencies and individuals thinking about water use in more of an ex-
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plicit cost benefit framework. Bokum (1996) recommends some form of cost benefit anal-
ysis for water transfers that might affect the public welfare in NM, and the public welfare 
clause contains language that would seem to permit it, though it does not require it. 
While agencies might deem it onerous to conduct this kind of work, obtaining explicit val-
ues for all the different types of uses to which water could be put in these basins could fa-
cilitate negotiations about alternatives. At the time of this writing, the Gallinas acequias, 
the City of Las Vegas, and other stakeholders are discussing a water sharing agreement. 
Obtaining some sort of clear values might be useful as part of this process. The effort of 
designing a comprehensive instrument would require participation from all groups, and 
that process alone would highlight perspectives that otherwise might not come out. 
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